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Adaptive Regret Minimization in Bounded-Memory
Games ?
Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, and Arunesh Sinha
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
{jblocki, nicolasc, danupam, aruneshs}@cmu.edu
Abstract Organizations that collect and use large volumes of personal informa-
tion often use security audits to protect data subjects from inappropriate uses of
this information by authorized insiders. In face of unknown incentives of em-
ployees, a reasonable audit strategy for the organization (defender) is one that
minimizes his regret. While regret minimization has been extensively studied in
repeated games, a repeated game cannot capture the full complexity of the inter-
action between the organization (defender) and an insider (adversary) that arises
from dependence of rewards and actions on history. We introduce a richer class
of games called bounded memory games, which can provide a more accurate
model of the audit process. The standard notion of regret for repeated games
is no longer suitable because actions and rewards can depend on the history of
play. To account for this generality, we introduce the notion of k-adaptive regret,
which compares the reward obtained by playing actions prescribed by the algo-
rithm against a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary with the reward obtained by
the best expert in hindsight against the same adversary. Roughly, a hypothetical
k-adaptive adversary adapts her strategy to the defender’s actions exactly as the
real adversary would within each window of k rounds. A k-adaptive adversary is
a natural model for temporary employees who stay for a certain number of audit
cycles and are then replaced by a different person. Our definition is parametrized
by a set of experts, which can include both fixed and adaptive defender strategies.
We investigate the inherent complexity of and design algorithms for adaptive
regret minimization in bounded memory games of perfect and imperfect infor-
mation. We prove a hardness result showing that, with imperfect information, any
k-adaptive regret minimizing algorithm (with fixed strategies as experts) must be
inefficient unless NP = RP even when playing against an oblivious adversary.
In contrast, for bounded memory games of perfect and imperfect information we
present approximate 0-adaptive regret minimization algorithms against an obli-
vious adversary running in time nO(1).
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1 Introduction
Online learning algorithms that minimize regret provide strong guarantees in situations
that involve repeatedly making decisions in an uncertain environment. There is a well
developed theory for regret minimization in repeated games [1]. The goal of this paper
is to study regret minimization for a richer class of settings. As a motivating example
consider a hospital (defender) where a series of temporary employees or business af-
filiates (adversary) access patient records for legitimate purposes (e.g., treatment or
payment) or inappropriately (e.g., out of curiosity about a family member or for finan-
cial gain). The hospital conducts audits to catch the violators, which involves expending
resources in the form of time spent in human investigation. On the other hand, viola-
tions that are missed internally and caught externally (by Government audits, patient
complaints, etc.) also result in various losses such as repuation loss, loss due to litiga-
tion, etc. The hospital wants to minimize its overall loss by balancing the cost of audits
with the risk of externally detected violations. In these settings with unknown adversary
incentives, a reasonable strategy for the defender is one that minimizes her regret.
Modeling this interaction as a repeated game of imperfect information is challen-
ging because this game has two additional characteristics that are not captured by a
repeated game model: (1) History-dependent rewards: The payoff function depends not
only on the current outcome but also on previous outcomes. For example, when a viola-
tion occurs the hospital might experience a greater loss if other violations have occured
in recent history. (2) History-dependent actions: Both players may adapt their strategies
based on history. For example, if many violations have been detected and punished in
recent history then a rational employee might choose to lay low rather than committing
another violation.
Instead, we capture this form of history dependence by introducing bounded me-
mory games, a subclass of stochastic games 1. In each round of a two-player bounded-
memory-m game, both players simultaneously play an action, observe an outcome and
receive a reward. In contrast to a repeated game, the payoffs may depend on the state of
the game. In contrast to a general stochastic game, the rewards may only depend on the
outcomes from the lastm rounds (e.g., violations that were caught in the lastm rounds)
as well as the actions of the players in the current round.
In a bounded memory game, the standard notion of regret for a repeated game is not
suitable because the adversary may adapt her actions based on the history of play. To
account for this generality, we introduce (in Section 4) the notion of k-adaptive regret,
which compares the reward obtained by playing actions prescribed by the algorithm
against a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary with the reward obtained by the best expert
in hindsight against the same adversary. Roughly, a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary
plays exactly the same actions as the real adversary except in the last k rounds where
she adapts her strategy to the defender’s actions exactly as the real adversary would.
When k = 0, this definition coincides with the standard definition of an oblivious ad-
1 Stochastic games [2] are expressive enough to model history dependence. However, there is
no regret minimization algorithm for the general class of stochastic games. While we do not
view this result as surprising or novel, we include it in the full version [3] of this paper for
completeness.
versary considered in defining regret for repeated games. When k = ∞ we get a fully
adaptive adversary. A k-adaptive adversary is a natural model for temporary employees
(e.g., residents, contractors) who stay for a certain number of audit cycles and are then
replaced by a different person. Our definition is parameterized by a set of experts, which
can include both fixed and adaptive defender strategies. In section 5 we use the example
of a police chief enforcing the speed limit at a popular tourist destination (or a hospital
auditing accesses to the patient records made by residents) to illustrate the power of
k-adaptive regret minimization when the defender plays against a series of temporary
adversaries.
Next, we investigate the inherent complexity of and design algorithms for adaptive
regret minimization in bounded-memory games of perfect and imperfect information.
Our results are summarized in Table 1. We prove a hardness result (Section 6; Theo-
rem 1) showing that, with imperfect information, any k-adaptive regret minimizing al-
gorithm (with fixed strategies as experts) must be inefficient unless NP = RP even
when playing against an oblivious adversary and even when k = 0. In fact, the result is
even stronger and applies to any γ-approximate k-adaptive regret minimizing algorithm
(ensuring that the regret bound converges to γ rather than 0 as the number of rounds
T → ∞) for γ < 1
8nβ
where n is the number of states in the game and β > 0. Our
hardness reduction from MAX3SAT uses the state of the bounded-memory game and
the history-dependence of rewards in a critical way.
We present an inefficient k-adaptive regret minimizing algorithm by reducing the
bounded-memory game to a repeated game. The algorithm is inefficient for bounded-
memory games when the number of experts is exponential in the number of states of
the game (e.g., if all fixed strategies are experts). In contrast, for bounded-memory
games of perfect information, we present an efficient nO(1/γ) time γ-approximate 0-
adaptive regret minimization algorithm against an oblivious adversary for any constant
γ > 0 (Section 7;Theorem 4). We also show how this algorithm can be adapted to
get an efficient γ-approximate 0-adaptive regret minimization algorithm for bounded-
memory games of imperfect information (Section 7;Theorem 5). The main novelty in
these algorithms is an implicit weight representation for an exponentially large set of
adaptive experts, which includes all fixed strategies.
Imperfect Information Perfect Information
Oblivious Regret (k = 0) Hard (Theorem 1) APX (Theorem 4)
APX (Theorem 5)
k-Adaptive Regret (k ≥ 1) Hard (Theorem 1) Hard (Full Version [3] )
Fully Adaptive Regret (k =∞) X (Full Version [3] ) X (Full Version [3] )
Table 1. Regret Minimization in Bounded Memory Games
X - no regret minimization algorithm exists
Hard - unless NP = RP no regret minimization algorithm is efficiently computable
APX - efficient approximate regret minimization algorithms exist.
2 Related Work
A closely related work is the Regret Minimizing Audit (RMA) mechanism of Blocki
et al. [4], which uses a repeated game model for the audit process. RMA deals with
history-dependent rewards under certain assumptions about the defender’s payoff func-
tion, but it does not consider history-dependent actions. While RMA provides strong
performance guarantees for the defender against a byzantine adversary, the performance
of RMA may be far from optimal when the adversary is rational (or nearly rational).
In subsequent work the same authors [5] introduced a model of a nearly rational ad-
versary who behaves in a rational manner most of the time. A nearly rational adversary
can usually be deterred from committing policy violations by high inspection and pu-
nishment levels. They suggested that the defender commit to his strategy before each
audit round (e.g., by publically releasing its inspection and punishment levels) as in a
Stackelberg game [6]. However, the paper gives no efficient algorithm for computing
the Stackelberg equilibrium.
More recent work by Blocki et al. introduced the notion of Audit Games [7] — a
simplified game theoretic model of the audit process in which the adversary is purely ra-
tional (unlike the nearly rational adversary of [5]). Audit Games generalize the model of
Security Games [8] by including punishment level as part of the defenders action space.
Because the punishment parameter introduces quadratic constraints into the optimiza-
tion problem that must be solved to compute the Stackelberg equilibria, this apparently
small change makes it difficult to find the Stackelberg equilibria. The primary technical
contribution of [5] is an efficient algorithm for computing the Stackelberg equilibrium
of Audit Games. There are two potential advantages of the k-adaptive regret framework
compared with the Stackelberg equilibria appraoch: (1) The k-adaptive regret minimi-
zation algorithm can be used even if the adversary’s incentives are unknown, and (2)
A k-adaptive adversary is a better model for a short term adversary (e.g., contractors,
tourists) who may not informed about the defender’s policy — and therefore may not
even know what the ‘rational’ best response is in a Stackelberg game. See section 5 for
additional discussion.
Stochastic games were defined by Shapley [2]. Much of the work on stochastic
games has focused on finding and computing equilibria for these games [2, 9]. There
has been lot of work in regret minimization for repeated games [1]. Regret minimi-
zation in stochastic games has not been the subject of much research. Papadimitriou
and Yannakakis showed that many natural optimization problems relating to stochastic
games are hard [10]. These results don’t apply to bounded memory games. Golovin
and Krause recently showed that a simple greedy algorithm can be used when a sto-
chastic optimization problem satisfies a property called adaptive submodularity [11].
In general, bounded memory games do not satisfy this property. Even-Dar, et al., show
that regret minimization is possible for a class of stochastic games (Markov Decision
Processes) in which the adversary chooses the reward function at each state but does
not influence the transitions [12]. They also prove that if the adversary controls the
reward function and the transitions, then it is NP-Hard to even approximate the best
fixed strategy. Mannor and Shimkin [13] show that if the adversary completely controls
the transition model (a Controlled Markov Process) then it is possible to separate the
stochastic game into a series of matrix games and efficiently minimize regret in each
matrix game. Bounded-memory games are a different subset of stochastic games where
the transitions and rewards are influenced by both players. While our hardness proof
shares techniques with Even-Dar, et al., [12], there are significant differences that arise
from the bounded-memory nature of the game. We provide a detailed comparison in
Section 6.
In a recent paper, Even-Dar, et al., [14] handle a few specific global cost functions
related to load balancing. These cost functions depend on history. In their setting, the
adversary obliviously plays actions from a joint distribution. In contrast, we consider
arbitrary cost functions with bounded dependence on history and adaptive adversaries.
Takimoto and Warmuth [15] developed an efficient online shortest path algorithm.
In their setting the experts consists of all fixed paths from the source to the destination.
Because there may be exponentially many paths their algorithm must use an implicit
weight representation. Awerbuch and Kleinberg later provided a general framework for
online linear optimization [16]. In our settings, an additional challenge arises because
experts adapt to adversary actions. See Section 7 for a more detailed comparison.
Farias, et al., [17] introduce a special class of adversaries that they call “flexible”
adversaries. A defender playing against a flexible adversary can minimize regret by
learning the average expected reward of every expert. Our work differs from theirs in
two ways. First, we work with a stochastic game as opposed to a repeated game. Second,
our algorithms can handle a sequence of different k-adaptive adversaries instead of
learning a single flexible adversary strategy. A single k-adaptive strategy is flexible, but
a sequence of k-adaptive adversaries is not.
3 Preliminaries
Bounded-memory games are a sub-class of stochastic games, in which outcomes and
states satisfy certain properties. Formally, a two-player stochastic game between an at-
tackerA and a defenderD is given by (XD,XA, Σ, P, τ), whereXA andXD are the ac-
tions spaces for playersA andD, respectively,Σ is the state space, P : Σ×XD×XA →
[0, 1] is the payoff function and τ : Σ × XD × XA × {0, 1}∗ → Σ is the randomized
transition function linking the different states. Thus, the payoff during round t depends
on the current state (denoted σt) in addition to the actions of the defender (dt) and the
adversary (at). We use n = |Σ| to denote the number of states.
A bounded-memory game with memory m (m ∈ N) is a stochastic game with the
following properties: (1) The game satisfies independent outcomes, and (2) The states
Σ = Om encode the last m outcomes, i.e., σi = (Oi−1, . . . , Oi−m). An outcome
of a given round of play is a signal observed by both players (called “public signal” in
games [18]). Outcomes depend probabilistically on the actions taken by the players. We
use O to denote the outcome space and Ot ∈ O to denote the outcome during round t.
We say that a game satisfies independent outcomes if Ot is conditionally independent
of
(
O1, ..., Ot−1
)
given dt and at. Notice that the defender and the adversary in a game
with independent outcomes may still select their actions based on history. However,
once those actions have been selected, the outcome is independent of the game history.
Note that a repeated game is a bounded-memory-0 game (a bounded-memory game
with memory m = 0).
A game in which players only observe the outcome Ot after round t but not the
actions taken during a round is called an imperfect information game. If both players
also observe the actions then the game is a perfect information game.
The history of a game H =
(
O1, O2, . . . , Oi, . . . , Ot
)
, is the sequence of out-
comes. We use Hk to denote the k most recent outcomes in the game (i.e., Hk =(
Ot−k+1; . . . ;Ot
)
), and t = |H| to denote the total number of rounds played. We use
Hi to denote the first i outcomes in a history (i.e., Hi =
(
O1, . . . , Oi
)
), and H;H ′ to
denote concatenation of histories H and H ′.
A fixed strategy for the defender in a stochastic game is a function f : Σ → XD
mapping each state to a fixed action. F denotes the set of all fixed strategies.
4 Definition of Regret
As discussed earlier, regret minimization in repeated games has received a lot of atten-
tion [19]. Unfortunately, the standard definition of regret in repeated games does not
directly apply to stochastic games. In a repeated game, regret is computed by com-
paring the performance of the defender strategy D with the performance of a fixed
strategy f . However, in a stochastic game, the actions of the defender and the adversary
in round i influence payoffs in each round for the rest of the game. Thus, it is unclear
how to choose a meaningful fixed strategy f as a reference. We solve this conundrum
by introducing an adversary-based definition of regret.
4.1 Adversary Model
We define a parameterized class of adversaries called k-adaptive adversaries, where the
parameter k denotes the level of adaptiveness of the adversary. Formally, we say that
an agent is k-adaptive if its strategy A(H) is defined by a function f : O∗ × N→ XA
such that A(H) = f (Hi, t), where i = t mod (k + 1). Recall that Hi is the i most
recent outcomes, and t = |H|.
As special cases we define an oblivious adversary (k = 0) and a fully adaptive ad-
versary (k =∞). Oblivious adversaries essentially play without any memory of the
previous outcomes. Fully adaptive adversaries, on the other hand, choose their actions
based on the entire outcome history since the start of the game. k-adaptive adversaries
lie somewhere in between. At the start of the game, they act as fully adaptive adversa-
ries, playing with the entire outcome history in mind. But, different from fully adaptive
adversaries, every k rounds, they “forget” about the entire history of the game and act as
if the whole game was starting afresh. As discussed earlier, there are numerous practical
instances where k-adaptive adversaries are an appropriate model; for instance, in games
in which one player (e.g., a firm) has a much longer length of play than the adversary
(e.g., a temporary employee), it may be judicious to model the adversary as k-adaptive.
In particular, k-adaptive adversaries are similar to the notion of “patient” players in
long-run games discussed by [20]. Their notion of “fully patient” players correspond to
fully adaptive adversaries, “myopic” players correspond to oblivious adversaries, and
“not myopic but less patient” players correspond to k-adaptive adversaries.
Another possible adversary definition could be to consider a sliding window of size
k as the adversary memory. But, because such an adversary can play actions to remind
herself of events in the arbitrary past, her memory is not actually bounded by k, and
regret minimization is not possible. See the full version [3] of this paper for details.
AKD and AKA denote all possible K-adaptive strategies for the defender and adver-
sary, respectively.
4.2 k-Adaptive Regret
Suppose that the defenderD and the adversaryA have produced historyH in a gameG
lasting T rounds. Let a1, ..., aT denote the sequence of actions played by the adversary.
In hindsight we can construct a hypothetical k-adaptive adversary Ak as follows:
Ak (H
′) = A
(
Ht−i;H ′i
)
,
where t = |H ′| and i = t mod (k + 1). In other words, the hypothetical k-adaptive
adversary replicates the plays the real adversary made in the actual game regardless
of the strategy of the defender he is playing against, except for the last i rounds under
consideration where he adapts his strategy to the defender’s actions in the same manner
the real adversary would.
Abusing notation slightly we write P (f,A,G, σ0, T ) to denote the expected payoff
the defender would receive over T rounds of G given that the defender plays strategy
f , the adversary uses strategy A and the initial state of the bounded-memory game G
is σ0. We use P¯ (f,A,G, T ) = P (f,A,G, σ0, T ) /T to denote the average per-round
payoff. We use
R¯k (D,A,G, T, S) = max
f∈S
P¯ (f,Ak, G, T )− P¯ (D,Ak, G, T ) ,
to denote the k-adaptive regret of the defender strategy D using a fixed set S of experts
against an adversary strategy A for T rounds of the game G.
Definition 1. A defender strategy D using a fixed set S of experts is a γ-approximate
k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm for the class of games G if and only if for
every adversary strategy A, every  > 0 and every game G ∈ G there exists T ′ > 0
such that ∀T > T ′
R¯k (D,A,G, T, S) < + γ .
If γ = 0 then we simply refer to D as a k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm. If D
runs in time poly (n, 1/) we call D efficient.
k-adaptive regret considers a k-adaptive hypothetical adversary who can adapt wi-
thin each window of size (at most) k + 1. Intuitively, as k increases this measure of
regret is more meaningful (as the hypothetical adversary increasingly resembles the
real adversary), albeit harder to minimize.
There are two important special cases to consider: k = 0 (oblivious regret) and
k = ∞ (adaptive regret). Adaptive regret is the strongest measure of regret. Observe
that if the actual adversary is k-adaptive then the hypothetical adversary A∞ is same as
the hypothetical adversary Ak, and hence R¯∞ = R¯k. Also, if the actual adversary is
oblivious then R¯∞ = R¯0 = R¯k.
In this paper G will typically denote the class of perfect/imperfect information
bounded-memory games with memory m. We are interested in expert sets S which
contain all of the fixed strategies F ⊆ S.
5 Audit Examples
As an example, consider the interaction between a police chief (defender) and drivers
(adversary) at a popular tourist destination. The police chief is given the task of enfor-
cing speed limits on local roads. Each day the police chief may deploy resources (e.g.,
radar, policemen) to monitor local roads, and drivers decide whether or not to speed or
not.
Repeated Game We first model the interaction above using a repeated game. We will
consider a simple version of this interaction in which the defender has two actions
XD = {HI,LI} ,
and the adversary has two actions
XA = {S,DS} .
Here, HI/LI stands for high/low inspection and S/DS stands for speed and don’t speed.
We consider the defender utilities in table 2.
Actions S DS
HI .19 0.7
LI 0.2 1
Table 2. Speeding
Game — Defender
Utility P
In this example, the costs of a higher inspection outweigh
the benefits of enforcing the policy. In any Nash Equilibria the
defender will play his dominant strategy — “always play LI.”
Similarly, any algorithm that minimizes regret in the standard
sense (0-adaptive) — like the regret minimizing audit mecha-
nism from [4] — must eventually converge to the dominant de-
fender strategy LI. While this is the best that the defender can
do against a byzantine adversary, this may not always be the
best result for the defender when playing against a rational ad-
versary. Consider the adversary’s utility defined in table 3.
If the defender plays his dominant strategy then the adver-
sary will always play the action S — speed. This action profile results in average utility
0.2 for the defender and 1 for the adversary. However, if the defender can commit to
his strategy in advance then he can play his Stackelberg equilibrium [6] strategy “play
HI with probability 0.2 and LI with probability 0.8.” A rational adversary will respond
by playing her best response — the action that maximizes her utility given the defen-
ders commitment. In this case the adversary’s best response is to play DS. The resulting
utility for the defender is 0.94!
Actions S DS
HI 0 0.8
LI 1 0.8
Table 3. Speeding
Game — Adversary
Utility
There are two practical challenges with adopting this ap-
proach: (1) If the utility of the adversary is unknown then the
defender cannot compute the Stackelberg equilibrium. (2) Even
if the defender commits to playing a Stackelberg equilibrium
it is unlikely that many drivers will respond in purely rational
manner for the simple reason that they are uniformed (e.g., a
tourist may not know whether or not speed limits are aggressi-
vely enforce in an unfamiliar area). If the adversary can learn
the Stackelberg Equilibrium from a history of the defender’s ac-
tions, then she might adapt her play to the best response strategy
over time. However, each tourist has a limited time window in
which she can make these observations and adjust her behavior (e.g., the tourist leaves
after at most k days).
Bounded Memory Game Model with k-adaptive regret We model the interaction above
using bounded memory games with k-adaptive adversary model. In each round of our
bounded memory game the defender and the adversary play an action profile, and ob-
serve an outcome — a public signal. The action space in our bounded memory game is
identical to the repeated game, and the outcomeO = {HI,LI} is simply the defender’s
action. That is we assume that our tourist driver can observe the defender’s inspection
level in each round (e.g., by counting the number of police cars by the side of the road).
The defender’s payoff function is identical to table 2 — the defender’s payoff is in-
dependent of the current state (e.g., rewards in this particular bounded memory game
are not history-dependent). A k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm could be run
without a priori knowledge of the adversary’s utility, and will converge to the optimal
fixed strategy against any k-adaptive adversary (e.g., any sequence of k-adaptive tourist
strategies).
It is reasonable to use a k-adaptive strategy to model the behavior of our tourist
drivers. Each tourist initially has no history of the defender’s actions — during the
first day of her visit a tourist must make the decision about whether or not to speed
without any history of the defender’s actions. After the first day the tourist may adapt his
behavior based on previous outcomes. For example, a tourist might adopt the following
k-adaptive strategy: A1 = “Play DS on the first day, and on the remaining (k − 1)
days play S if the defender has never played HI previously, otherwise play DS.” After k
days the tourist leaves and a new tourist arrives. This new tourist may adopt a different
k-adaptive strategy (e.g., A2 = “Play S on the first day, and on the remaining (k − 1)
days play S if the defender has never played HI previously, otherwise play DS.”).
We set the memory of our bounded memory game to be m = k. Now the fixed
defender strategies F in our bounded memory game include strategies like f = “play
HI every k’th round”. Suppose for example that k = 7 and the defender plays f . In this
case the sequence of rewards that the defender would see against the first k-adaptive
adversary A1 would be (0.7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). The sequence of rewards that the defender
would see against the second k-adaptive adversary A2 would be (0.19, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1).
It is easy to verify that this is the optimal result for the defender — if the defender
does not play HI on the first day then the 7-adaptive adversary will speed on day 2.
A k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm could be run without a priori knowledge
of the adversary’s utility, and will converge to the optimal fixed strategy against any
k-adaptive adversary (e.g., any sequence of k-adaptive tourist strategies).
Remark 1. A k-adaptive adversary is also an appropriate model for a temporary em-
ployee at the hospital so we could also consider the interaction between a hospital (de-
fender) and a resident (adversary) at the hospital. The actions S and DS(e.g., “speed”
and “don’t speed”) would be replaced with corresponding actions B and V (e.g., “be-
have” and “violate”).
Unfortunateley, we are able to prove that there is no efficient k-adaptive regret mi-
nimization algorithm for general bounded memory games. However, our results do not
rule out the posibility of an efficient γ-approximate k-adaptive regret minimization al-
gorithm. Finding an efficient γ-approximate k-adaptive regret minimization algorithms
is an important open problem.
6 Hardness Results
In this section, we show that unless NP = RP no oblivious regret minimization al-
gorithm which uses the fixed strategies F as experts can be efficient in the imperfect
information setting. In the full version [3] of this paper we explain how our hardness re-
duction can be adapted to prove that there is no efficient k-adaptive regret minimization
algorithm in the perfect information setting for k ≥ 1.
Specifically, we consider the subclass of bounded-memory games G with the fol-
lowing properties: |O| = O(1), m = O (log n), |XA| = O(1), |XD| = O(1) and
imperfect information. Any G ∈ G is a game of imperfect information (on round t the
defender observes Ot, but not at) with O(n) states. Our goal is to prove the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. For any β > 0 and γ < 1/8nβ there is no efficient γ-approximate obli-
vious regret minimization algorithm which uses the fixed strategies F as experts against
oblivious adversaries for the class of imperfect information bounded-memory-m games
unless NP = RP.
Given a slightly stronger complexity-theoretic assumption called the randomized
exponential time hypothesis [21] we can prove a slightly stronger hardness result. The
randomized exponential time hypothesis says that no randomized algorithm running in
time 2o(n) can solve SAT.
Theorem 2. Assume that the randomized exponential time hypothesis is true. Then for
any γ < 1/
(
8 log2 n
)
there is no efficient γ-approximate oblivious regret minimization
algorithm which uses the fixed strategies F as experts against oblivious adversaries for
the class of imperfect information bounded-memory-m games.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 use the fact that it is hard to approximate MAX3SAT
within any factor better than 78 [22]. This means that unless NP = RP then for every
constant β > 0 and every randomized algorithm S in RP , there exists a MAX3SAT
instance φ such that the expected number of clauses in φ unsatisfied by S(φ) is≥ 18−β
even though there exists an assignment satisfying (1− β) fraction of the clauses in φ.
We reduce a MAX3SAT formula φ with variables x1, ..., xn and clauses C1, ..., C`
to a bounded-memory game G described formally below. We provide a high level over-
view of the game G before describing the details. The main idea is to construct G so
that the rewards in G are related to the fraction of clauses of φ that are satisfied.
In G, for each variable x there is a state σx associated with that variable. The obli-
vious adversary controls the transitions between variables. This allows the oblivious
adversary AR to partition the game into stages of length n, such that during each stage
the adversary causes the game to visit each variable exactly once (each state is associa-
ted with a variable). During each stage the adversary picks a clause C at random. In G
we have 0, 1 ∈ XD. Intuitively, the defender chooses assignment x = 1 by playing the
action 1 while visiting the variable x. The defender receives a reward if and only if he
succeeds in satisfying the clause C.
The game G is defined as follows:
Defender Actions: XD = {0, 1, 2}
Adversary Actions: XA = {0, 1} × {0, 1, 2, 3}
Outcomes and States: Each round i produces two outcomes
O˜i = ~ai[1] and Oˆi =
{
1 if di = 2 or di = ai[2];
0 otherwise.
Observe that these outcomes satisfy the independent outcomes requirement for bounded-
memory games. There are n = 2m+1 states, where σi is the state at round i, where
σi =
(
〈O˜i−1, . . . , O˜i−m〉, Oˆi−1
)
.
Observe that each state encodes the last m outcomes O˜ and the last outcome Oˆi. Intui-
tively, the last m outcomes O˜i are used to denote the variable xi, while Oˆi is 1 if the
defender has already received a reward during the current phase.
The defender actions 0, 1 correspond to the truth assignments 0, 1. The defender
receives a reward for the correct assignment. The defender is punished if he attempts to
obtain a reward in any phase after he has already received a reward in that phase. Once
the defender has already received a reward he can play the special action 2 to avoid
getting punished. The intuitive meaning of the adversary’s actions is explained below.
If we ignore the outcome Oˆ then the states form a De Bruijn graph [23] where each
node corresponds to a variable of φ. Notice that the adversary completely controls the
outcomes O˜ with the first component of his action ~a[1]. By playing a De Bruijn se-
quence S = s1...sn the adversary can guarantee that we repeatedly take a Hamiltonian
cycle over states(for an example see Figure 1).
Rewards:2
P
(
σi, di, ai
)
=

−1 if Oˆi−1 = 1 and di 6= 2 and ~ai[2] 6= 3;
1 if di 6= 2 and di = ~ai[2] and Oˆi−1 = 0;
0 otherwise.
2 We use payoffs in the range [−1, 1] for ease of presentation. These payoffs can easily be re-
scaled to lie in [0, 1].
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Figure 1. De Bruijn example
An intuitive interpretation of the reward function is presented in parallel with the ad-
versary strategy.
Adversary Strategy: The first component of the adversary’s action (~a[1]) controls
the transitions between variables. The adversary will play the action ~ai[2] = 1 (resp.
~ai[2] = 0) whenever the corresponding variable assignment xi = 1 (resp. xi = 0)
satisfies the clause that the adversary chose for the current phase.
If neither variable assignment satisfies the clause (if xi /∈ C and x¯i /∈ C) then the
adversary plays ~ai[2] = 2. This ensures that a defender can only be rewarded during a
round if he satisfies the clause C, which happens when di = ~ai[2] = 0 or 1.
Notice that whenever Oˆ = 1 there is no way to receive a positive reward. The de-
fender may want the game G to return to a state where Oˆ = 0, but unless the adversary
plays the special action ~ai[2] = 3 he is penalized when this happens. The adversary
action ~ai[2] = 3 is a special ‘reset phase’ action. By playing ~ai[2] = 3 once at the end
of each phase the adversary can ensure that the maximum payoff the defender receives
during any phase is 1. See Figure 1 for a formal description of the adversary strategy.
• Input: MAX3SAT instance φ, with
variables x1, . . . , xn−1 , and clauses
C1, . . . , C`. Random string R ∈ {0, 1}∗
• De Bruijn sequence: s0, ..., sn−1
• Round t: Set i← t mod n.
1. Select Clause: If i = 0 then se-
lect a clause C uniformly at random from
C1, ..., C` using R.
2. Select Move:
ai =

(si, 3) if i = 0;
(si, 1) if xi ∈ C;
(si, 0) if x¯i ∈ C;
(si, 2) otherwise.
Figure 2. Oblivious Adversary: AR
Analysis: At a high level, our hardness
argument proceeds as follows:
1. If there is an assignment that satisfies
(1 − β) fraction of the clauses in φ,
then there is a fixed strategy that per-
forms well in expectation (see Claim
1).
2. If there a fixed strategy that per-
forms well in expectation, then any
γ-approximate oblivious regret mi-
nimization algorithm will perform
well in expectation (see Claim 2).
3. If an efficiently computable strategy
D performs well in expectation, then
there is an efficiently computable
randomized algorithm S to approxi-
mate MAX3SAT (see Claim 3). This
would imply that NP = RP.
Claim 1 Suppose that there is a variable assignment that satisfies (1− β) · ` of the
clauses in φ. Then there is a fixed strategy f such thatER
[
P¯ (f,AR, G, n)
] ≥ (1− β) /n
, where R is used to denote the random coin tosses of the oblivious adversary.
Claim 2 Suppose that D is an
(
1
8n − 3βn
)
-approximate oblivious regret minimization
algorithm against the class of oblivious adversaries and there is a variable assignment
that satisfies (1− β) fraction of the clauses in φ. Then for T = poly(n)
ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
] ≥ 7
8n
+
β
n
,
where R is used to denote the random coin tosses of the oblivious adversary.
Claim 3 Fix a polynomial p(·) and let α = n · ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
]
, where T =
p(n) and D is any polynomial time computable strategy. There is a polynomial time
randomized algorithm S which satisfies α fraction of the clauses from φ in expectation.
The proofs of these claims can be found in the full version [3] of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 1. The key point is that if an algorithm S runs in time O (p(n)) on
instances of size nβ for some polynomial p(n) then on instances of size n S runs in
time O
(
p
(
n1/β
))
which is still polynomial time. Unless NP = RP ∀, β > 0 and
every algorithm S running in time poly(n), there exists an integer n and a MAX3SAT
formula φ with nβ variables such that
1. There is an assignment satisfying at least (1− ) of the clauses in φ.
2. The expected fraction of clauses in φ satisfied by S is ≤ 78 + .
If we reduce from a MAX3SAT instance with nβ variables we can construct a game
with O(n) states (n1−β copies of each variable). One Hamiltonian cycle would now
corresponds to n1−β phases of the game. This means that the expected average reward
of the optimal fixed strategy is at least
max
f∈F
ER
[
P¯ (f,AR, G, T )
] ≥ n1−β (1− )
n
,
while the expected average reward of an efficient defender strategy D is at most
ER
[
P¯ (D,AR, G, T )
] ≤ n1−β ( 78 + )
n
.
Therefore, the expected average regret is at least
R¯0 (D,AR, G, T, F ) ≥
(
1
8
− 2
)
n−β .

The proof of theorem 2 is similar to the proof of theorem 1. It can be found in the
full version [3] of this paper.
Our hardness reduction is similar to a result from Even-Dar, et al., [12]. They consi-
der regret minimization in a Markov Decision Process where the adversary controls
the transition model. Their game is not a bounded-memory game; in particular it does
not satisfy our independent outcomes condition. The current state in their game can
depend on the last n actions. In contrast, we consider bounded-memory games with
m = O (log n), so that the current state only depends on the last m actions. This makes
it much more challenging to enforce guarantees such as “the defender can only receive
a reward once in each window of n rounds”—a property that is used in the hardness
proof. The adversary is oblivious so she will not remember this fact, and the game itself
cannot record whether a reward was givenm+1 rounds ago. We circumvented this pro-
blem by designing a payoff function in which the defender is penalized for allowing the
game to “forget” when the last reward was given, thus effectively enforcing the desired
property.
7 Regret Minimization Algorithms
In section 7.1 we present a reduction from bounded-memory games to repeated games.
This reduction can be used to create a k-adaptive regret minimizing algorithm (Theo-
rem 3). This is significant because there is no k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm
for the general class of stochastic games. A consequence of Theorem 1 is that when
the expert set includes all fixed strategies F we cannot hope for an efficient algorithm
unless NP = RP. In section 7.2 we present an efficient approximate 0-adaptive regret
minimization algorithm for bounded-memory games of perfect information. The algo-
rithm uses an implicit weight representation to efficiently sample the experts and update
their weights. Finaly, we show how this algorithm can be adapted to obtain an efficient
approximate 0-adaptive regret minimization algorithm for bounded-memory games of
imperfect information.
7.1 Reduction to Repeated Games
All of our regret minimization algorithms work by first reducing the bounded-memory
game G to a repeated game ρ (G,K). One round of the repeated game ρ (G,K) cor-
responds to K rounds of G. Before each round of ρ (G,K) both players commit to an
adaptive strategy. In ρ (G,K) the reward that the defender gets for playing a strategy
f ∈ AKD is the reward that the defender would have received for using the strategy f for
the nextK rounds of the actual gameG if the initial state were σ0: P (f, g, ρ (G,K)) =
P (f, g,G, σ0,K).
The rewards in ρ (G,K) may be different from the actual rewards in G because the
initial state before each K rounds might not be σ0. Claim 4 bounds the difference bet-
ween the hypothetical losses from ρ (G,K) and actual losses in G using the bounded-
memory property. The proof of Claim 4 is in the full version of this paper [3].
Claim 4 For any adaptive defender strategy f ∈ AKD and any adaptive adversary stra-
tegy g ∈ AKA and any state σ of G we have |P (f, g,G, σ,K)− P (f, g,G, σ0,K)| ≤
m .
The key idea behind our k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm BW is to reduce
the original bounded-memory game to a repeated game ρ (G,K) of imperfect informa-
tion (K ≡ 0 mod k). In particular we obtain the regret bound in Theorem 3. Details
and proofs can be found in the full version of this paper [3].
Theorem 3. Let G be any bounded-memory-m game with n states and let A be any
adversary strategy. After playing T rounds of G against A, BW (G,K) achieves regret
bound
R¯k (BW, A,G, T, S) <
m
T 1/4
+ 4
√
N logN
T 1/4
,
where N = |S| is the number of experts, A is the adversary strategy and K has been
chosen so that K = T 1/4 and K ≡ 0 mod k.
Intuitively, the m/T 1/4 = m/K term is due to modeling loss from Claim 4 and the
other term comes from the standard regret bound of [24].
7.2 Efficient Approximate Regret Minimization Algorithms
In this section we present EXBW (Efficient approXimate Bounded Memory Weighted
Majority), an efficient algorithm to approximately minimize regret against an oblivious
adversary in bounded-memory games with perfect information. The set of experts E
used by our algorithms contains the fixed strategies F as well as all K-adaptive strate-
gies AKD (K = m/γ). We prove the following theorem
Theorem 4. Let G be any bounded-memory-m game of perfect information with n
states and let A be any adversary strategy. Playing T rounds of G against A, EXBW
runs in total time TnO(1/γ) and achieves regret bound
R¯0 (EXBW, A,G, T, E) ≤ γ +O
m
γ
√
m
γ n log (N)
T
 ,
where K has been set to m/γ and N =
∣∣AKD ∣∣ = (|XD|)n1/γ is the number of K-
adaptive strategies.
In particular, for any constant γ there is an efficient γ-approximate 0-adaptive regret
minimization algorithm for bounded-memory games of perfect information. We can
adapt this algorithm to get EXBWII (Efficient approXimate Bounded Memory Weighted
Majority for Imperfect Information Games), an efficient approximate 0-adaptive regret
minimization algorithm for games of imperfect information using a sampling strategy
described in the full version of this paper [3].
Theorem 5. Let G be any bounded-memory-m game of imperfect information with n
states and let A be any adversary strategy. There is an algorithm EXBWII that runs in
total time TnO(1/γ) playing T rounds of G against A, and achieves regret bound
R¯0 (EXBWII, A,G, T, E) ≤ 2γ +O
mn1/γ
γ2
√
mn1/γ
γ n log (N)
T
 .
where K has been set to m/γ and N =
∣∣AKD ∣∣ = (|XD|)n1/γ is the number of K-
adaptive strategies.
The regret bound of Theorem 4 is simply the regret bound achieved by the standard
weighted majority algorithm [25] plus the modeling loss term from Claim 4. The main
challenge is to provide an efficient simulation of the weighted majority algorithm. There
are an exponential number of experts so no efficient algorithm can explicitly maintain
weights for each of these experts. To simulate the weighted majority algorithm EXBW
implicitly maintains the weight of each expert.
To simulate the weighted majority algorithm we must be able to efficiently sample
from our weighted set of experts (see Sample (E)) and efficiently update the weights of
each expert in the set after each round of ρ (G,K) (see update weight stage of EXBW).
Meet the Experts Instead of using F as the set of experts, EXBW uses a larger set
of experts E (F ⊂ E). Recall that a K-adaptive strategy is a function f mapping the
K most recent outcomes HK to actions. We use a set of K-adaptive strategies E =
{fσ : σ ∈ Σ} ⊂ AKD to define an expert E in ρ (G,K): if the current state of the
real bounded-memory game G is σ then E uses the K-adaptive strategy fσ in the next
round of ρ (G,K) (i.e., the next K rounds of G). E denotes the set of all such experts.
Maintaining Weights for Experts Implicitly To implicitly maintain the weights of
each expert E ∈ E we use the concept of a game trace. We say that a game trace p =
σ, d1, O1, ..., di−1, Oi−1, di is consistent with an expert E if fσ
(
O1, ..., Oj−1
)
= dj
for each j. We define the set C (E) to be the set of all such consistent traces of maximum
length K and C = ⋃E∈E C (E) denotes the set of all traces consistent with some expert
E ∈ E . EXBW maintains a weight wp on each trace p ∈ C. The weight of an expert E
is then defined to be WE =
∏
p∈C(E) wp.
Given adversary actions~a = a1, ..., aK and a trace p = σ, d1, O1, ..., di−1, Oi−1, di
we defineR (~a, σ′, p).
R (~a, σ′, p) =
{
0 if σ 6= σ′;∏
j<i Pr
[
Oj aj , dj
]
otherwise;
Intuitively, R (~a, σ′, p)
is the probability that
each outcome of pwould
have occurred given the
adversary actions were
~a and the initial state was σ′. We use ` (p,~a, σ′) to denote the payment that the
defender received for playing di (the last action in p). Formally ` (p,~a, σ′) =
P
(
σfp , d
i, ai
)R (~a, σ′, p), where σfp denotes the state reached following the trace p
(after observing outcomes O1, ..., Oi−1 starting from σ0) and di is the final defender
action in the trace. Notice that in the imperfect information setting the defender could
not compute ` because he would not observe the adversary’s actions ~a.
Updating Weights Efficiently While updating weights EXBW maintains the invariant
that wp = β
∑T/K
j=1 `(p,~a
j ,σjK), where σjK is the state ofG after jK rounds and ~at is the
actions the adversary played during the j’th round of ρ (G,K). The standard weighted
majority algorithm maintains the invariant that WE = β
∑T/K
j=1 P(E,~a
t,ρ(G,K)). Claim 5
implies that EXBW also maintains this invariant with its implicit weight representation
— the proof of Claim 5 is in the full version of this paper [3].
Claim 5 ∏
p∈C(E)
β
∑T/K
j=1 `(p,~a
j ,σjK) = β
∑T/K
j=1 P(E,~a
j ,ρ(G,K)) .
Sampling Experts Efficiently We can also efficiently sample from E using dynamic
programming (see Sample (E)). Using the notation p @ p′ for p′ extends p we can
define wˆp. Intuitively, wˆp;O;d represents the weight of the action d from history p;O.
wˆp =
∑
E:p∈C(E)
∏
p′∈C(E)∧p@p′
wp′
Using dynamic programming we can efficiently
compute wˆp for each trace p because there are
only nO(1/γ) such traces. Using the weights wˆp
we can efficiently sample from E . We use p;O; d
to denote a new game trace which contains all of
the outcomes/actions in p appended with O and d.
Algorithm: EXBW (γ,G)
• Initialize: K = m/γ
• Construct: ρ (G,K)
• Each Round:
1. σ ← G.CurrentState
2. E ← Sample (E)
3. Play E
4. Observe adversary actions
~a = a1, ..., aK .
5. Update Weights: For each p ∈ C
A. Compute ` (p,~a, σ)
B. Set wp ← wp × β`(p,~a,σ).
Algorithm: Sample (E)
• For each trace p ∈ C recursively compute
wˆp using the formula:
wˆp =
∑
O∈O
∑
d∈XD
β
∑T
t=1 `(p;O;d,~a
t,σKt)wˆp;O;d .
• Build Strategy E: For each p ∈ C and O ∈
O, randomly select d ∈ XD
Pr [d p, O] =
wˆp;O;d∑
d′∈XD wˆp;O;d′
.
• E play d any time it observes history p;O.
Claim 6 says that Sample (E) outputs each expert E with probability proportional
to WE .
Claim 6 For each expert E ∈ E Algorithm Sample (E) outputs E with probability
Pr [E] ∝WE .
Given Sample (E) it is straightforward to simulate the standard weighted majority
algorithm. To update weights EXBW simply loops through all traces p ∈ C applying
the update rule wp = wp × β`(p,~a
t,σtK), where β is a learning parameter we tune later.
The formal proof of Theorem 4 can be found in the full version along with the proof of
claim 6.
At a high level our algorithm is similar to the online shortest path algorithm develo-
ped by Takimoto and Warmuth [15]. In their work, they consider the set of all source-
destination paths in a graph as experts. Since there are exponentially many paths they
also maintain the weights of the experts implicitly. In their setting, the defender com-
pletely controls the chosen path. In contrast, our experts adapt to adversary actions.
The challenge was constructing a new implicit weight representation which works for
K-adaptive strategies.
Using this implicit weight representation we could have also used the general ba-
rycentric spanner approach to online linear optimization developed by Awerbuch and
Kleinberg [16] to design a γ-approximate 0-adaptive regret minimization algorithm run-
ning in time nO(1/γ). However, we are able to achieve better regret bounds in theorem
4 by simulating the weighted majority algorithm. Awerbuch and Kleinberg [16, Theo-
rem 2.8] achieve the average regret bound O
(
Md5/3/T 1/3
)
, where d is the dimension
of the problem space and M is a bound on the cost vectors. By comparison our regret
bounds in Theorems 4 and 5 tend to 0 with 1/
√
T . In our setting, the dimension of
the problem space is d = O
(
n(1/γ)
)
(the number of nodes in the decision tree), and
M = K = m/γ is the upper bound on the cost vector in each round of ρ (G,K). The
average regret bound would be O
(
m
γ n
5/(3γ)/T 1/3
)
. the regret bound is proportional
to
√
n1/γ/T . By comparison Theorem 4 has a
√
n1/γ in the numerator.
The standard regret minimization trick for dealing with imperfect information in a
repeated game is to break the game up into phases and perform random sampling in
each round to estimate the cost of each expert and update weights. The challenge in
adapting EXBW is that there are exponentially many experts in E . Our key idea was
to estimate ` (p,~a, σ) for each p ∈ C so there are only nO(1/γ) samples to take in each
phase. We can then update the implicit weight representation using the estimated values
` (p,~a, σ).
8 Open Questions
In this paper, we defined a new class of games called bounded-memory games, intro-
duced several new notions of regret, and presented hardness results and algorithms for
regret minimization in this subclass of stochastic games. Because both the games and
the notions of regret we study in this paper rely on novel definitions, they raise a number
of interesting open problems: (1) To what extent can the hardness results of Theorems
1 and 2 be further improved? (γ = 1/log n?) Could similar hardness results apply to
games with perfect information? (2) Is there an efficient non-approximate oblivious
regret minimization algorithm for bounded-memory games with perfect information?
(3) Is there a γ-approximate oblivious regret minimization algorithm with running time
no(1/γ)? For example, could one design a γ-approximate oblivious regret minimization
algorithm with running time n− log γ? (4) For repeated games (m = 0) is there an effi-
cient γ-approximate k-adaptive regret minimization algorithm if we use AKD as our set
of experts (K = log n)?
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